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I. Introduction
In recent years the link between human capital investment and economic
growth has grown tighter in the minds of a broad spectrum of economists
and development policy makers. Although the precise nature of the rela-
tionship between human capital investment and economic growth is still
unclear and a subject of much research, it is difficult to find cases in
which broadly based economic growth has occurred without substantial
levels of investment in human capital. The new growth theory in particu-
lar reflects the belief that human capital investment is crucial to eco-
nomic growth. Since the fundamental work of Robert Lucas,1 recent the-
oretical models now routinely portray human capital investment as a
primary engine of economic growth.2
Many of these models, however, underemphasize the structure of
the microeconomic decision-making process that gives rise to human
capital investment. In both developed and developing countries, human
capital investment is typically a household-level decision made in the
form of schooling for children. For families who operate household en-
terprises in developing countries this decision involves an economic
trade-off between future returns to schooling and the current return to
children’s labor in the household enterprise. This research analyzes how
access to credit in developing countries can affect the child-schooling de-
cision.
Early contributions to the human capital literature such as the works
of Gary Becker and Jacob Mincer implicitly assume that well-function-
ing credit markets allow families to choose optimal levels of human cap-
ital investment in children.3 However, even as Milton Friedman noted
years ago, credit market imperfections may lead to an underinvestment
in human capital, since loans for educational purposes are difficult to se-
cure and are based on uncertain and widely varying expected earnings.4
ª 1999 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
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This notion is supported by the empirical research of J. Behrman, R. Pol-
lak, and P. Taubman, who show that unequal access to credit markets
can result in a misallocation of educational investment.5 Their results are
obtained by contrasting the educational investment behavior of a sample
of veterans who enjoyed access to school loans through the GI bill with
a subsequent generation who did not enjoy such access to loans.
A large body of research has illustrated how poorly functioning
credit markets, especially in developing countries, can result in a sig-
nificant misallocation of resources by household enterprises. For exam-
ple, M. Rosenzweig and K. Wolpin show how missing credit markets
create an environment in which Indian farmers misallocate inputs into
farm production.6 In simulations using a CGE model of Moroccan agri-
culture, A. de Janvry, E. Sadoulet, and M. Fafchamps show that credit
constraints accompanied by other market failures distort households’ use
of both adult and child labor as inputs in agricultural production.7
Other recent research has specifically focused on the negative ef-
fects of credit market failure on human capital investment in developing
countries. For example, Lars Ljungqvist demonstrates how missing
credit markets for human capital investment can result in an ‘‘underde-
velopment trap’’ in poor countries.8 H. G. Jacoby modifies a model de-
veloped by Y. Ben-Porath to test the effects of credit constraints on
grade completion in Peru. Empirical results from the Peruvian data sug-
gest that unequal access to credit is indeed an important source of in-
equality in schooling investment.9
The logical policy conclusion from this line of research has fre-
quently been for credit market intervention on both efficiency and equity
grounds.10 As a consequence, an enormous number of targeted credit pro-
grams have emerged across the developing world seeking to direct credit
toward both the rural and urban informal sectors.11 Many of these pro-
grams, such as the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and the ACCION Inter-
national affiliates in Latin America, have been able to boast of both rap-
idly increasing participation rates and repayment rates approaching
100% from their small loans.12 As a consequence of the widespread suc-
cess of microenterprise lending, an agreement was reached in January
1997 in Washington, D.C., between international development agencies,
commercial banks, and governmental authorities to channel $21.6 billion
toward microenterprise programs over the next 8 years. The stated goal
of this effort is to extend credit to at least 100 million impoverished
households around the world by the year 2005.13
But while immense sums of money are being allocated toward
microenterprise lending, relatively little formal research has been carried
out on the impact the implementation of such programs has had on the
economic behavior of the loan recipients. As a result, understanding the
impact of targeted credit programs on the economic behavior of house-
holds has emerged as an important concern for policy makers. This arti-
cle focuses on one particular question with respect to changes in eco-
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nomic behavior that may occur with the introduction of microenterprise
credit programs: How does credit access by household enterprises affect
the schooling decisions these households make for their children?
In contrast with previous work that points to the positive impact of
credit access on schooling, the theoretical results of this research show
that the effect of credit access may be either positive or negative. In the
case of family enterprises we would expect that if working capital con-
straints are binding, child labor would often be used as a substitute for
hired labor. Results show that a major effect of access to credit is that a
relaxation of working capital constraints allows the family to substitute
hired labor for the labor of children. I will refer to this phenomenon as
the ‘‘family-labor-substitution effect.’’14
However, the theoretical results in this article derive a second and
opposite effect of access to credit on child-schooling investment: as a
household enterprise becomes more heavily capitalized, the marginal
product of family labor increases, raising the opportunity cost of school-
ing. I refer to this second as the ‘‘household-enterprise-capitalization ef-
fect.’’ If the household-enterprise-capitalization effect dominates the
family-labor-substitution effect, investment in schooling could theoreti-
cally decrease as credit constraints are relaxed for household enterprises.
The main contribution of this research is to show that either one of
these two effects of credit on schooling may dominate under different
circumstances. In enterprises where the potential for moral hazard by
hired labor is high, for example, the family-labor-substitution effect may
be small, since hired labor may require intensive supervision. In contrast,
because family labor effort directly affects family consumption, it may
require less supervision. In addition, families can employ extraeconomic
means of inducing an optimal level of labor effort by children.15 Thus,
in such situations hired labor may be a poor substitute for family labor.
The positive effect of access to credit on child schooling may be further
mitigated in cases in which borrowed funds are exhausted on large,
lumpy investments in machinery or other types of physical capital goods.
As investment in physical capital raises labor productivity and increases
the opportunity cost of schooling, child schooling may actually decrease
as a result of access to credit.
Data to test the effect of access to credit on child schooling were
obtained through a firsthand survey of household enterprises carried out
in western Guatemala in conjunction with Fundacion para el Desarrollo
Integral de Programas Socioeconomicos (Foundation for the Integrated
Development of Socioeconomic Programs [FUNDAP]),16 a microenter-
prise lending program that has been operating in the region since 1988.
The survey was administered to 236 operators of household enterprises,
primarily in and around the rural towns of Quetzaltenango and Totonica-
pan. Household enterprises in the sample varied greatly in the number
of years they have enjoyed access to credit, since FUNDAP has had to
slowly introduce its program into different village areas over time, be-
This content downloaded from 138.202.189.84 on Wed, 3 Dec 2014 16:52:10 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
856 Economic Development and Cultural Change
cause of logistical constraints. This, combined with the fact that the
amount of credit a household can borrow from FUNDAP is largely a
function of the number of years of borrowing with the institution, pro-
vided the setting for a natural experiment to test the effect of increasing
levels of credit access on economic behavior in a cross-sectional empiri-
cal analysis.
Conclusions from empirical testing using these data show that in
general the family-labor-substitution effect appears to dominate to the
extent that better credit access generally has a positive effect on child
schooling. Yet tests on the survey data confirm that this generally posi-
tive impact of access to credit on schooling may be mitigated when hired
labor and child labor are not easily substitutable. This occurs in the con-
text of enterprises characterized by a high potential for moral hazard by
hired labor, and in households where parents display a preference for im-
parting skills to child labor rather than to hired labor, such as in the fabri-
cation of traditional products. In the Guatemalan data sample these ap-
pear to include household retail enterprises, where hired labor must be
continually supervised to prevent theft or lackadaisical sales effort. They
also appear to include enterprises such as those that produce traditional
cloth and consumer textiles, in which buyers place a heavy emphasis on
the quality and detail of work. Furthermore, by imparting skills to chil-
dren rather than hired labor through apprenticeship-type relationships,
parents are more likely to recapture future returns to their effort than they
are by training hired workers whose tenure may be short-lived.
Empirical results also confirm the existence of the household-
enterprise-capitalization effect. Specifically, they reveal that the likeli-
hood of a child being withdrawn from school for work in a household
enterprise is greater in cases in which borrowers use funds for the pur-
chase of capital equipment instead of strictly for working capital pur-
poses.
The rest of this article is organized as follows: Section II presents
a two-period household model that endogenously generates an optimal
level of child schooling by households, accounting for the possibility of
asymmetric information in credit and labor markets. Comparative statics
are then carried out to show the conditions under which child schooling
will increase or decrease when credit constraints are relaxed. A brief
background of the schooling system in Guatemala and a brief description
of the survey data collected in Guatemala are provided in Sections III
and IV, respectively. Section V presents empirical tests, and Section VI
concludes with a summary of empirical findings from the Guatemalan
data and suggestions for further research.
II. A Two-Period Household Model of Child-Schooling Investment
The following simple model represents a family seeking to maximize in-
come over two periods. In the first period, the parents of the family man-
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age a household enterprise, such as a small farm, retail store, or light
manufacturing business. During this first period, the family must decide
on the allocation of inputs to the family enterprise, which potentially can
include the labor of the household’s children. In the second period, the
parents retire, the family enterprise ceases production, and the family is
supported by the labor market earnings of its children as they enter adult-
hood. Other motives for borrowing will be left aside in order to focus on
the effect of credit access on relieving working capital and physical capi-
tal constraints.17 Formally, it is assumed that the family maximizes the
utility of income in two periods, Y1 and Y2,
U(Y1,Y2) 5 Y1 1 Y2, (1)
subject to
Y1 5 f (k,L,1 2 h) 2 wL 2 rk, (2)
Y2 5 b h, (3)
and
0 # W 2 wL 2 rk, (4)
where k is capital, L is hired labor, and a family divides the time endow-
ment of its children between family labor (1 2 h) and schooling, h. The
family enterprise is faced with a working capital constraint equal to W .
Exogenously given parameters in the model include the wage rate, w, the
rental rate of capital, r, and the second-period return to schooling, b . Of
particular interest is the production function, f (× ), which is increasing,
twice differentiable, and concave in all three inputs, and is characterized
by cross derivatives between inputs such that f 12 . 0, f 13 . 0, and f 23 #
0.18 The last of these cross derivatives provides analytical flexibility con-
cerning the substitutability of hired labor for family labor. When these
constraints are incorporated into a standard Lagrangian framework, the
following maximization problem is obtained,
max
k,L,h
Z 5 f (k,L,1 2 h) 2 wL 2 rk 1 l (W 2 wL 2 rk) 1 b h, (5)
and its associated first-order conditions:
¶ Z
¶ k
5 f 1 2 r(1 1 l ) 5 0, (6a)
¶ Z
¶ L
5 f 2 2 w(1 1 l ) 5 0, (6b)
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¶ Z
¶ h
5 2f 3 1 b 5 0, (6c)
and
¶ Z
¶l
5 W 2 wL 2 rk 5 0. (6d)
An interesting note about the first-order conditions is that the cost of
family labor is the only one of the three inputs whose shadow price is
not inflated if the credit constraint is binding ( l . 0). This renders fam-
ily labor a relatively more attractive input in an environment with poorly
functioning credit markets. Totally differentiating the system of equa-
tions in (6a–d) yields an expression for ¶ h/ ¶ W , which can be obtained
via Cramer’s Rule. The sign of this derivative shows the effect on child
schooling when the household enterprise gains increased access to credit.
This expression is presented in equation (7). (A technical appendix that
shows this derivation can be provided by the author on request.)
sign ¶ h
¶W
5 sign3 f 321 f 11 2 rw f 122 1 f 311 rw f 22 2 f 1224 (7)
The first effect, given by the first term in equation (7), is the family-
labor-substitution effect. The second effect, shown in the second term in
equation (7), is the household-enterprise-capitalization effect. The mag-
nitude of the family-labor-substitution effect is influenced by the value
of f 32, which indicates the substitutability of hired labor for family labor.
The magnitude of the household-enterprise-capitalization effect is given
by f 31, which indicates the extent to which child labor is rendered more
productive as the household enterprise becomes increasingly capitalized.
Note that as f 31 approaches zero, the labor-substitution effect dominates,
and child schooling increases with the relaxation of the capital con-
straint. However, as f 32 goes to zero, the capitalization effect dominates,
and children are withdrawn from school because of their increased pro-
ductivity in the household enterprise.
Therefore, in a test of the model we would expect to see measures
of access to credit displaying a positive effect on schooling for house-
hold enterprises in which the risk of moral hazard by hired labor is small.
Conversely, we would expect to see this generally positive effect of
credit mitigated in household enterprises in which hired labor and family
labor are not easily substitutable and in enterprises that have used loans
to purchase new capital equipment.
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III. Background: Education and Schooling in Western Guatemala
Despite efforts by the Guatemalan government to promote school atten-
dance, Guatemala’s illiteracy rate is one of the highest in the Western
Hemisphere. Estimates by Unesco put the adult illiteracy rate in 1990 at
44.9%, with the rate estimated to be 52.9% for women. World Bank sta-
tistics place Guatemalan illiteracy rates at levels nearly as high as for
countries such as Haiti, which have far fewer resources to potentially de-
vote to education.19 Illiteracy is particularly high among the rural indige-
nous peoples of Guatemala, often reaching extremely high levels among
some rural village groups.
Guatemalan law dictates that primary schooling, which begins at
age 7 and lasts for 6 years, is compulsory. However, this rule is enforced
only in the urban areas and is routinely violated by families who believe
that it is in the economic interest of the household to withdraw children
from school in order to supplement family income. The tendency of fam-
ilies to withdraw their children from school can be observed in Guatema-
lan school enrollment data. In 1987, for example, the number of students
enrolled in primary school as a percentage of all primary-school-aged
children was only 77%; for secondary school the figure slips to 21%.20
IV. The Guatemalan Survey
During the summer months of 1994, I organized and helped carry out a
survey of household enterprises in western Guatemala, in and around the
towns of Quetzaltenango (population 96,000) and Totonicapan (popula-
tion 9,000). FUNDAP, a nongovernmental and nonprofit institution, had
provided 236 of these household enterprises with a relatively steady
source of credit at a 2.5% monthly interest rate, a rate roughly equal to
that charged in large commercial loans in Guatemala’s formal financial
sector. Virtually all borrowers reported that previous to their association
with FUNDAP they had experienced difficulty borrowing in capital mar-
kets, able to obtain only small loans from relatives or, in the case of
some urban borrowers, very expensive loans from local moneylenders at
interest rates as high as 10% per month. However, the FUNDAP borrow-
ers had received access to credit for varying lengths of time. While some
households were located in areas in which FUNDAP had carried out
lending operations for up to 6 years, other households were located in
village areas where FUNDAP had initiated lending activity only within
the last 12 months. An integral component of FUNDAP’s credit policy
is to release increasing amounts of credit slowly over a sequence of loans
to borrowers. This policy, along with FUNDAP’s only gradual introduc-
tion of credit into different areas in western Guatemala, provided a valu-
able instrument for ascertaining the impact of varying degrees of credit
access.
About two-thirds of the sample consisted of rural borrowers, who
were more often productores, frequently involved in the production of
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TABLE 1
Summary Statistics from Guatemalan Survey Data
Rural Urban
Household Household
Total Enterprises Enterprises
Mean age of child (years) 13.68 13.75 13.52
Mean schooling of parent (years) 2.66 2.22 3.57
Proportion of urban households .32 .00 1.00
Mean gross business revenue (Quetzales;
5.73Q 5 $1) 3,723 3,723 3,721
CREDYR (1,000 Quetzales)* 6.49 5.80 7.85
Proportion in sample:
Boys† .56 .55 .56
Retail enterprises .20 .06 .48
Traditional cloth .27 .39 .00
Tailoring .28 .41 .00
Butchers .06 .00 .17
Carpentry .03 .04 .00
Children currently attending school .69 .58 .91
Children working in household
enterprise .52 .63 .26
Children working in household enter-
prise and not attending school .31 .41 .09
* CREDYR is the instrumental-variable-estimated amount of capital borrowed by a
household from FUNDAP within the previous 12 months.
† Error during data collection resulted in unrecorded gender on 56 child observations.
traditional and nontraditional textiles, shoes, candles, or furniture. Most
of the urban borrowers were comerciantes, selling food, clothes, and a
variety of household goods in the city markets.
From this data set, observations of 292 children aged 10–18 were used
in the empirical study. This age-group was selected because it was during
these years that parents appeared to make decisions regarding the trade-off
between continued investment in schooling and work within the house-
hold enterprise. Although a few borrowers who were surveyed reported
that children had left school to work somewhere other than the family
business, these instances were quite rare, since the potential for moral
hazard is significantly reduced when children work under the supervision
of parents. All children from households in the survey had access to both
primary and secondary schooling. However, those from the rural areas
faced higher costs of schooling in the form of longer travel to and from
schools. The number of children per household between ages 10 and 18
used in the empirical study from each enterprise ranged from one to four.
Statistics in table 1 show the substantial difference in school atten-
dance between urban and rural areas. In urban areas nearly 91% of chil-
dren in the sample were still continuing in school, while just 58% were
attending school in the rural areas. In addition, rural areas show a much
higher proportion of children working in household enterprises than ur-
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ban areas show—63% as opposed to 26%. The difference in parental ed-
ucation is also substantial. The formal education of the parent primarily
in charge of operating the household enterprise averages 3.6 years in ur-
ban areas but only 2.2 years in rural areas.
V. Empirical Testing
Empirical tests on the data tried to ascertain the conditions under which
better access to credit increases schooling investment in children and the
conditions under which this positive effect is mitigated. The survey pro-
vided data on children’s age and sex,21 characteristics of the family and
family enterprise, borrowing and income, and current child labor and
school activity. Empirical estimations tested for a link between a proxy
for access to credit (total credit received during the previous 12 months)
and the probability that a child was reported to be withdrawn from
school for work in the family enterprise, subject to a vector of control
variables that were also expected to influence the schooling decision.
A potential problem with such an estimation, however, is that the
amount borrowed by an enterprise may be endogenous to the schooling
decision. (A plausible story is that more ‘‘motivated’’ parents may both
have the resources to gain better access to credit and keep their children
in school longer.) Thus it is necessary to carry out a two-stage estima-
tion, first using exogenous instruments to obtain estimated values for
credit access and then using these estimated values to ascertain the effect
of credit access on child schooling. The nature of FUNDAP’s lending
policy gave rise to some obvious variables to use as instruments for
credit access. FUNDAP’s timing of the introduction of credit into differ-
ent regions is clearly exogenous to the schooling decision, and the num-
ber of years of borrowing greatly determines the amount of credit the
institution is willing to release to a borrower. Thus, the number of years
a household has had a borrowing relationship with FUNDAP was used
as one instrument, along with a measure of gross monthly sales, another
factor FUNDAP uses in determining the amount of credit given to a bor-
rower.
There is a potential problem with using estimated variables as right-
hand-side variables in a maximum-likelihood logit estimation. With a
nonlinear estimation, the slope of the logit function is not generally equal
to the slope of the distribution function of the estimated variable used in
the logit. Because the bias is of second order, however, it is generally
believed to be quite small.22 But to act as a diagnostic on the results of
the logit-estimated parameters, estimations were also carried out using
OLS in a linear probability model (which are asymptotically unbiased,
although not minimum variance). The logit estimations take the form
log1 Pi1 2 Pi2 5 a 1 y xˆi 1 b ¢ yi, (8)
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where Pi is the probability that a child is withdrawn from school and
working in a household enterprise, or pr(WDSCHOOL) 5 1, xˆi 5 d¢ zi
and xˆi is a measure of credit access, zi is a vector of exogenous instru-
ments, yi is a vector of control variables, a and y are estimated parame-
ters, and b and d are vectors of estimated parameters. Estimated values
of y are thus intended to capture the effect of access to credit on the
child-schooling decision. The linear probability model, in contrast, uses
OLS to estimate
Pˆ i 5 f 1 g xˆi 1 l¢ yi, (9)
where Pˆ i is the estimated probability that child i is withdrawn from
school and working in the household enterprise, g is the instrumental
variable (IV) estimated effect of access to credit on schooling, and l
again is a vector of parameters for the control variables. Results of these
estimations are shown in table 2.
Results of the estimations confirm that, in general, increased access
to credit reduces the likelihood that a child will be withdrawn from
school to work in the household enterprise. The variable CREDYR re-
flects the total amount of capital borrowed by the household enterprise
from FUNDAP in the last 12 months. The estimations in table 2 show
the significance of CREDYR at the 99% confidence level. Using the logit
point estimations from the third column in table 2, this implies that an
increase in borrowing of 1,000 quetzales (about $180) would decrease
pr(WDSCHOOL) by approximately 4.7%, with probabilities evaluated at
their means. Since the mean level of borrowing by households in the sur-
vey is around 6,400 quetzales, it could be estimated that for the average
household in the survey, access to credit has reduced the probability of
a child being withdrawn from school by roughly 30%; the OLS estima-
tions indicate a reduced probability of about 17%.
Other variables also appear to significantly affect the child-school-
ing decision. Most of these make clear intuitive sense and are the find-
ings of other empirical work. Every additional year in the age of a
child increases pr(WDSCHOOL) by 17.0%. An urban location reduces
pr(WDSCHOOL) by 43.7%. The coefficient measuring the impact of pa-
rental education carries the expected sign but is not statistically signifi-
cant. It is interesting that gender has no statistically significant effect on
the probability of being withdrawn from school in the sample of the 236
children for whom gender information was available.
What is perhaps more interesting in the estimations in table 2 is
the effect of increased lending to specific types of enterprises on
pr(WDSCHOOL). During the course of the survey, owners of retail en-
terprises expressed a strong personal preference for family labor over
hired labor. They maintained that employing nonfamily labor, especially
when it was an individual with whom they had had few previous deal-
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ings, entailed risks of petty theft or shirking by the employee and created
the need for supervision. Family labor was believed to be more trust-
worthy.
The five most common types of enterprises in the sample were in-
cluded in the estimation. The test of whether increased borrowing by a
specific type of enterprise increases pr(WDSCHOOL) is the significance
of the coefficients on the right-hand-side variables Ti 3 (CREDYR),
where Ti is a dummy variable representing the ith type of enterprise. The
estimations in table 2 show statistically significant coefficients on two
(and sometimes three) types of enterprises: fabricators of corte (Guate-
malan traditional cloth), tailoring shops, and, in some of the estimations,
retail enterprises. While the significance of the coefficient measuring the
impact of retail enterprise capitalization was expected given the potential
for moral hazard that exists within this type of enterprise, the negative
impact on child-schooling investment of borrowing by corte manufactur-
ers and tailors was surprising. The result was surprising because hired
workers who produce both corte and modern textiles are routinely paid
on a piece-rate basis by the owners of the loom on which the cloth is
made, a traditional incentive mechanism that mitigates moral hazard
problems by hired labor.
Yet follow-up questions to the Guatemalan household survey re-
vealed the statistical results to be indicative of the following phenome-
non. The quality of corte is of great concern, since high-quality cloth of
intricate detail sells in local markets at prices multiple times higher than
less intricate corte. However, the ability to produce corte of fine detail
requires years of intensive training. It became clear that parents with the
know-how to make such cloth were willing to undertake this kind of
long-term apprenticeship with their own children, since they knew that
the rewards of the training would ultimately be captured within the
household. In this way increases in physical capital may increase the re-
turn to trade-specific human capital. However, parents were less willing
to undertake such a substantial investment in the training of hired labor-
ers, who might then take these skills to establish their own enterprise. In
addition, parents may feel that it is easier for them to capture the returns
from this type of apprenticeship than it would be for them to capture
the returns from formal schooling. Future returns to formal schooling
are likely to occur in urban areas located far away from the house-
hold, where expenses of modern living might well diminish remittances
to parents.
Credit access may thus help foster the formation of such parent and
child apprenticeships, whereas before credit access, formal schooling
may have offered the only means of investing in the future labor produc-
tivity of children. Although a detailed study of parent and child appren-
ticeships is beyond the scope of this article, the following point can be
made: When there is a high degree of nonsubstitutability between hired
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labor and child labor, credit access may actually reduce investment in
schooling rather than facilitate such investment. In other words, the ef-
fects of policy interventions to correct imperfections in credit markets may
in some cases be dampened by remaining imperfections in labor markets.
The logit estimations in table 3 provide evidence for the household-
enterprise-capitalization effect. A priori, we would only expect this ef-
fect to be manifest when loans are used to purchase physical capital.
Therefore, to identify the existence of the household-enterprise-
capitalization effect, the estimations in table 3 are made after splitting
the sample between children of borrowers who used loans to make in-
vestments in physical capital and those who used borrowed funds for
working capital purposes only.23 The difference in the coefficients on
CREDYR between the two samples shows how the positive effect of ac-
cess to credit on schooling decreases as household enterprises become
increasingly capitalized. In the estimations on the split sample in table
3, the coefficient on CREDYR in columns 1 and 2 is significantly and
strongly negative when borrowed credit is not used to purchase new
equipmment. In contrast, the point estimate of the coefficient is statisti-
cally insignificant in columns 3 and 4 and even becomes positive in col-
umn 4, when loans are used to purchase new equipment.24 Because the
estimations in table 3 are in reduced form, the statistical insignificance
of the coefficients on CREDYR in columns 3 and 4 is not bothersome;
the estimations merely show the mitigating force of household enterprise
capitalization on the generally positive effect that greater access to credit
has on child schooling.
VI. Conclusion
The empirical conclusions from this research generally support findings
from previous research that access to credit increases schooling invest-
ment in children. The major contribution of this research, however, is
to show that the relationship between access to credit and schooling in-
vestment is not unequivocally positive. Although microenterprise credit
programs may alleviate many of the harsh consequences of imperfect
information-plagued credit markets, this research shows that investment
in child schooling also depends on labor market factors. If the potential
for moral hazard exists within household enterprises, families may still
prefer to use children’s labor rather than hired labor, despite the fact that
the relaxation of credit constraints could allow hired labor to be substi-
tuted for child labor. The positive effect of credit on child schooling may
be further mitigated by the physical capitalization of the household enter-
prise. Enterprise capitalization increases the return to child labor and
thus the opportunity cost of schooling. As a consequence, the relief of
credit constraints in a developing country setting like Guatemala does
not appear to unambiguously increase investment in child schooling as
previous research has suggested.
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A variety of policies could be considered that might bolster the pos-
itive effect of access to credit on schooling. Although most involve real
or implicit costs to household producers, they may be justified by the
positive externalities associated with education. As a first approach, local
policy makers might seek to either increase the minimum age require-
ment for school attendance or increase penalties to families for child tru-
ancy. Policies by targeted credit programs could make continued access
to credit contingent on a schooling requirement for children within the
household enterprise. The obvious disadvantage of such policies, how-
ever, is that they impose costs and constraints on households that may
already live only marginally above the subsistence level. Since the pool
of potential borrowers for most credit programs is usually very large, al-
ternative lending policies might instead direct lending efforts toward
those businesses that can more easily afford to substitute hired labor for
family labor.
The aim of future research might be to ascertain if the relationship
between access to credit and child schooling presented here is consistent
with the impact of microenterprise credit programs operating in other de-
veloping countries. This could also include estimations on the return to
schooling within the sample region in order to more accurately assess
the trade-offs between child labor and investment in schooling.
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